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however, reason that such a constitutional provision prevents attachment where the
defendant is unable to comply with the terms of the decree, but not where he is able to
comply but refuses, as in the present case. It is said in the latter case the imprisonment
is not for the debt but for the contempt in refusing to pay. Hurd v. Hurd, 63 Minn.
443, 6 5 N.W. 728 (1896). Such an analysis leads to the conclusion that the equity
courts' power is not in reality restricted, for inability to comply with a decree traditionally purged a defendant of contempt. Blake v. People, 8o Ill. 1T (1875); Davison v.
Davison, 125 Kan. 807, 266 Pac. 650 (1928); Lakewood Trust Co. v. Lawshane Co., 102
N.J.Eq. 270, 14o Atl. 334 (1928); but see Cook, Powers of a Court of Equity, 15 Col.
L. Rev. lo6, 112, n. 18 (1915).
Even if it is assumed that the imprisonment for debt provision restricts the power of
a court of equity to enforce money decrees, it is generally held that the obligation to pay
alimony is not a debt within the meaning of the constitutional provision. Wiglitinan v.
Wightman, 45 Ill. 167 (1867); White v. White, 233 Mass. 39, 123 N.E. 389 (1919);
contra, Coughlin v. Ehbert, 29 Mo. 285 (1866). And the nature of the obligation should
not be altered when the original alimony decree is merged in the decree in the present
suit. White v. White, 233 Mass. 39, 123 N.E. 389 (1919).
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Insurance-Sunstroke as Death by Accidental Means-[Federal].-The petitioner
as beneficiary sought recovery upon two insurance policies providing for payment upon
death from "external, violent and accidental means"; one policy excluded liability if
death resulted "wholly or partly from disease or physical or mental infirmity." The
declaration alleged that insured suffered a sunstroke while playing golf and that there
was, unknown to him, a "temporary disorder or condition of his body not amounting
to a physical or mental infirmity." Held, that the order sustaining the demurrer be
affirmed. Landress v. Phoenix Mitt. Life Ins. Co., 54 Sup. Ct. 461 (1934). Cardozo, J.,
dissenting.
Doubtless the insurer in using the term "death by external, violent and accidental
means" rather than "accidental death" intended to limit liability to cases in which
some accidental means caused the death, as distinguished from situations where the
result alone is accidental and the act constituting the ineans is intentional. See Vance,
Insurance (2d ed. 1930), 871, § 258. This distinction between "accidental means" and
"accidental result" has been universally recognized, U.S. Mutual Assn. v. Barry, 131
U.S. 100, 9 Sup. Ct. 755, 33 L. Ed. 6o (r889), but courts have differed in their application of it. In sunstroke cases involving facts similar to the present case, apparently all
th6 federal courts and a number of the state courts refuse recovery because the sun's
rays do not constitute a mishap or accident, and the subjection to them is voluntary.
Nickman v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 39 F. (2d) 763 (C.C.A. 6th 1928); Paistv. Aetna Life Ins.
Co., 54 F. (2d) 393 (D.C. Pa. 1931): Harloev. Cal. State Life Ins. Co., 206 Cal. 141, 273
Pac. 56o (1929); Continental Casualty Co. v. Pittman, 145 Ga. 641, 89 S.E. 716 (i916);
Semancik v. Continental Casualty Co., 56 Pa. Super. Ct. 392 (1914). If by accident a
person is subjected to the sun's rays and dies from sunstroke, recovery is allowed; the
accident is treated as the means of the death. Richards v. StandardAccident Ins. Co.,
58 Utah 622, 200 Pac. 1017 (1921), see Sinclairv. Maritime PassengersAssur. Co., 3 El.
& El. 487, 7 Jurist (N.S.) 367 (1861). The other state decisions adopt an interpretation
of "accidental means" broader than that intended by the insurer, and hold that if the
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result is accidental, it has been caused by accidental means. Continental Casualty Co. v.
Bruden, 178 Ark. 683, ii S.W. (2d) 493 (1928); Tate v. Benefit Assn. of Ry. Employees,
186 Minn. 538, 243 N.W. 694 (1932), 17 Minn. L.Rev. 216 (x933); Lower v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., iii N.J.L. 426, 168 Aft. 592 (1933).
If there is a natural and reasonable difference of import between the two terms,
"accidental death" and "accidental means," that difference will be given effect. inperial Fire Ins. Co. v. Coos County, 151 U.S. 452, 14 Sup. Ct. 379,38 L. Ed. 231 (1894);
Hawkeye Comm. Men's Assn. v. Christy, 294 Fed. 208 (C.C.A. 8th 1923). To the layman
the words "external, violent and accidental means" would seem to suggest that the
means be accidental as well as the result, and thus would support the view of the majority in the present case. See Cooper, Accidental Means Insurance, 25 In. L. Rev.
673 (1931). Mr. Justice Cardozo in urging the opposite interpretation bases his argument on the layman's conception of an accident, rather than the layman's conception
of the wording of the policy after careful perusal; and many of the cases he relies upon
can be distinguished on the exact wording of the policies involved. In some cases the
policy includes sunstroke as a bodily injury and seems to leave open the question of
accidental means; but it may be inferred that the policy does include death by sunstroke since it is difficult to conceive of sunstroke being brought on by other than intended means. Higgins v. M11idland Casualty Co., 281 Ill. 431, 118 N.E. ii (1917);
Eslev v. Fidelity & CasualtyCo., 187 Ind. 447, 12o N.E. 42 (1918), Gallagherv. Fidelity
& Casualty Co., 221 N.Y. 664, 117 N.E. iO67 (1914); Continental Casualty Co. v. Clark,
70 Okla. 187, 173 Pac. 453 (1918); Bryant v. Continental Casualty Co., 107 Tex. 582,
182 S.W. 673 (1916). It also might be said that the express mention of sunstroke would
lead a man to believe the policy did cover that cause of death, and, in case of ambiguity, it should be construed in favor of the insured. Harrisv. Am. Casualty Co., 83
N.J.L. 641, 85 At. 194 (1912); Weiss v. Union m demnity Co., 107 N.J.L. 348, 153 Adt.
508 (1931). In other cases, express provisions provide for liability if death is caused by
sunstroke. Pack v. PrudentialCasualty Co., 140 Ky. 47, 185 S.W. 496 (1916); Mather
v. London Guarantee & Accident Co., 125 Minn. 186, 145 N.W. 963 (1914).
While sunstroke technically is and has been treated in some cases as a disease,
Dozier v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 46 Fed. 446 (C.C.Mo. 1891); Sinclair v. Assurance
Co., 2 El. & El. 478, 7 Jurist (N.S.) 367 (186i), almost all of the later cases regard it as
an accident. See Lower v. MetropolitanLife Ins. Co., 11i N.J.L. 426, 168 At. 592 (1933).
The clause in one of the policies excluding the insurer from liability if death should result partially from a disease seems of no importance whether sunstroke is treated as a
disease or as an accidental injury, since diseases attributable solely to an external force
and not existing in the insured at the time of the accident are not regarded as causes of
the death, but as effects of the accident. The disease is considered only a link in the
chain of causation and the accident is looked upon as the actual cause of the death.
Western Comm. Tray. Assn. v. Smith, 85 Fed. 4O (C.C.A. 8th 1898); Aetna Life Ins.
Co. v. Allen, 32 F. (2d) 490 (C.C.A. 1st 1929); Paistv. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 54 F. (2d)
393 (D.C.Pa. 1931).
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Mortgages-Claim of Junior Mortgagee to Prior Lien for Payment of Taxes on.
Premises-[New York].-In an action for the foreclosure of a prior mortgage, junior
mortgagees interposed a defense and counterclaim for taxes and water rents which they
had paid, claiming equitable subrogation to the rights and remedies of the taxing body,

